Korea, Republic of - Zimbabwe BIT (2010)
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FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

Attachments

Expropriation

The Parties confirm their shared understanding that:

1. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right in an investment.

2. Article 5 addresses two situations. The first is direct expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.

3. The second situation addressed by Article 5 is indirect expropriation, where an action or a series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.

(a) The determination of whether an action or a series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers all relevant factors relating to the investment, including:

(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or a series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred:

(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations (2); and

(iii) the character of the government action, including its objectives and context. Relevant considerations could include whether the government action imposes a special sacrifice on the particular investor or investment that exceeds what the investor or investment should be expected to endure for the public interest.

(b) Except in rare circumstances, such as, for example, when an action or a series of actions is extremely severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose or effect, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, and real estate price stabilization (through, for example, measures to improve the housing conditions for low-income households), do not constitute indirect expropriations. (3)

(2) For greater certainty, whether an investor's investment-backed expectations are reasonable depends in part on the nature and extent of governmental regulation in the relevant sector. For example, an investor's expectations that regulations will not change are less likely to be reasonable in a heavily regulated sector than in a less heavily regulated sector.
(3) For greater certainty, the list of "legitimate public welfare objectives" in subparagraph (b) is not exhaustive.
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